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This article uses the farm problem theory as the framework for a comparative 
analysis of cooperative, market and hierarchical organization in the agrifood 
system. In order to carry out this analysis, the article proposes the organiza-
tional economics approach to the farm problem which supplements the 
traditional approaches explaining it in terms of low opportunity costs and 
high mobility costs of factors employed in agriculture. According to the pro-
posed organizational economics approach, the farm problem is the outcome 
of inappropriateness of hierarchical and market organization for effective co-
ordination of agricultural activities. The central argument of the article is that 
agricultural cooperatives are important because they partially perform the co-
ordination functions not effectively delivered in agriculture by the 
conventional hierarchical and market types of economic organization.  
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Introduction 
In the last decade, the research in organizational economics has undergone a remark-
able shift from the paradigmatic dichotomy between markets and hierarchies to the 
study of a broad set of hybrid organizational arrangements which cannot be attributed 
to any of the former (Menard, 2004). Cooperatives have also been recognized as hy-
brid organizations exhibiting a mixture of properties of markets and hierarchies 
(Beckmann, 2000; Bonus, 1986). The pervasive presence of cooperatives and other 
hybrids in the capitalist economies naturally provokes a question why markets and 
hierarchies, coordinated respectively by prices and authority relations, are not suffi-
cient to provide efficient governance of transactions (see e.g., Williamson, 1991; 
Grandori and Soda, 1995; Menard, 2004). A suitable arena for conducting such a 
comparative institutional analysis is represented by the agrifood system containing a 
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number of distinct types of economic organization, such as family farms, markets, 
hierarchies, cooperatives, and other forms of vertical coordination.  
This article will be aimed to identify the organizational economics rationale be-
hind agricultural cooperatives existing within the capitalist agrifood systems. Three 
questions will be hereby addressed: 1) why cooperatives exist there beside markets 
and hierarchies?; 2) what are (some of) their comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages?; 3) what role is played by cooperatives in processes of structural change? 
In the organizational economics literature there are a number of important studies 
identifying the advantages of cooperatives in comparison with alternative organiza-
tional forms. For example, Bonus (1986) and Staatz (1987) explain the choice of 
cooperative organizational form in terms of its ability to economize on transaction 
costs, whereas Hansmann (1996) traces the existence of cooperatives to high costs of 
market contracting and low costs of ownership for cooperative members. Whereas both 
Staatz (1987) and Hansmann (1996) seem to recognize that the agrifood system repre-
sents a particularly suitable field for the formation of cooperatives, their explanations 
still do not explicitly clarify what sector-specific characteristics of the agrifood system 
make cooperatives organization superior over its alternatives. 
The objective of this article is to offer a sector-specific explanation of agricultural 
cooperatives. The distinctive feature of such an explanation is that it will not only 
focus on the ability of cooperatives to reduce certain types of transaction costs and 
overcome market power asymmetries, but also show how these transaction costs and 
power asymmetries are conditioned by the organizational attributes of the agrifood 
system. This explanation will be developed by means of resorting to the farm prob-
lem theory which is aimed at the identification of disadvantages of agricultural 
producers in their economic relations with their up- and downstream business part-
ners (the major references of the theory are Schultz, 1945; Johnson, 1960; Tweeten, 
1971; Brandow, 1977; Cochrane, 1958 and 1985; and Gardner, 1992. The major dis-
advantages of this type analyzed by the theory, include: inelasticity of demand for 
agricultural products and inputs; dependence upon stochastic biological and climatic 
factors (see e.g., Seitz et al., 1994); high asset specificity which impedes resource 
mobility out of agriculture (see Hathaway, 1963); the significant length of production 
cycle; significant differentials in market power between agricultural producers and 
up- and downstream firms. These disadvantages have been giving rise to disparities 
in the socio-economic development of agriculture and the adjacent sectors in the 
agrifood system. A major economic aspect of these disparities lies in the fact that 
factor incomes in agriculture have been evaluated as persistently lower and more 
unstable than in other sectors, which has become known as ‘the farm problem
2.  
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The idea of this article is to rationalize the cooperative organization as the re-
sponse of agricultural producers to the above-mentioned limitations of agriculture 
which give rise to the farm problem. The relationship between cooperation and the 
farm problem is not immediately obvious; however, its visibility depends on the 
theoretical approach that is used to explain the farm problem itself. Whereas the tra-
ditional approaches to the farm problem focus on intersectoral differences in 
opportunity costs and mobility costs of production factors, they largely leave out of 
consideration the organizational attributes of agricultural production. The article 
seeks to fill in this gap by developing the organizational economics approach to the 
farm problem, explaining it by the poor suitability of market and hierarchical organ-
izational instruments for the organizational attributes of agricultural production. In 
the framework of the organizational economics approach, agricultural cooperatives 
assume those functions of intra- and intersectoral coordination that cannot be effec-
tively delivered by markets and hierarchies.  
Agricultural cooperation and the farm problem 
The objective of the section is to briefly review the existing theoretical approaches to 
the farm problem and to develop an alternative, organizational economics, approach. 
Traditional views of the farm problem 
A most straightforward explanation of the farm problem has been developed by 
Schultz (1945) on the basis of supply-demand mechanism dynamics. According to 
Schultz, the farm problem results from the inelasticity of both supply and demand of 
agricultural products. The short-run and, more importantly, long-run ineslaticity of 
supply is explained by uniqueness of agricultural occupation in rural areas, and high 
sector-specificity of capital investment. The depressed condition of agricultural 
prices is caused by two factors: 1) disparity in the rates of growth of supply and de-
mand; and 2) inelasticity of supply and demand, disabling the effective adaptation to 
this disparity. Johnson (1960) attributed the farm problem to high asset fixity in agri-
culture, defined as commensurate to the distance between the acquisition cost of farm 
assets and their salvage value. The very low salvage values (approaching zero) of 
assets make it worthwhile to continue productive use even after a decline in prices.  
Cochrane (1958) has proposed the so-called “treadmill model”, which attributes 
the expansion of output in the face of falling prices to technological innovation. Ac-
cording to the model, by early adoption of new technologies, progressive farmers can 
receive above-average short-run profits. As the pressure to adopt the technology in-
creases and it becomes more popular, the profits are dissipated, while output is 
increased and prices have further declined.  
These and other known explanations of the farm problem share in common their focus 
on low opportunity costs on factor use in agriculture and high factor mobility costs, i.e., on 
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Institutional view of the farm problem 
Hagedorn (2003) has argued that although the “technical” explanations of the depres-
sion of factor incomes in agriculture can be true, the specific institutional framework 
of agriculture also plays an important role for maintaining the farm problem. The 
institution of family farm has a special integrative nature because it simultaneously 
functions in several roles: 1) the family of the farmer as a social system; 2) the joint 
household of the family members; 3) the farm as the technical production unit. Con-
sequently, the family farm is characterized by “institutional cumulation of transaction 
costs” because the costs of factor mobility not only accrue to the individual members 
of family farm separately, but are jointly and as a whole taken into account in the 
collective decisions of the farm family on factor reallocation, which leads to delay in 
structural change and the disparity of factor incomes. Thus, in Hagedorn’s frame-
work, the farm problem is caused by special institutional characteristics of the family 
farm. 
The limitation of this institutional approach to the inter-sectoral disparities in the 
agrifood system lies in its relevance only for the family farm system, whereas these 
disparities are also quite significant for transitional economies, where family farms 
often occupy a minor share in terms of area and agricultural output. This limitation 
can be overcome by employing the organizational economics approach to the farm 
problem, which focuses on the general organizational attributes of agricultural pro-
duction. 
The viewpoint of economic organization 
This section presents an organizational economics approach to the farm problem 
which is based on a comparison between markets and hierarchies, on the one hand, 
and cooperatives, on the other, in promoting the economic interests of agricultural 
producers in the agrifood system. This approach allows to establish the explicit con-
ceptual links between the farm problem and cooperative organization, which mainly 
could not be achieved in the framework of the traditional approaches discussed 
above. 
The limitations of hierarchies and markets in agriculture 
Agriculture as an area of productive activity has a number of general attributes im-
portantly distinguishing it from other sectors of the economy, including high asset 
specificity which impedes resource mobility out of agriculture (Hathaway, 1963); 
inelastic demand for agricultural products and inputs; special role of land as a pro-
duction factors, etc. However, the most fundamental sector-specific attribute, having 
dramatic implications for agricultural organization, is the significant dependence of 
agricultural production on nature, including biological and climatic factors.  
High dependence on nature means that agricultural producers have relatively low 
control over the processes and results of production, which complicates its planning, 
monitoring, and supervision (Schmitt, 1993b:57). The problem of supervision be-
comes particularly acute in the case of using hired labor due to the following reasons:     The Organizational Nature of Agricultural Cooperatives  143 
 
1) the workers for technological reasons cannot be gathered together in a single loca-
tion (Pollak, 1985:591), and therefore cannot be effectively monitored; 2) the 
outcomes of production are inherently uncertain due to unpredictable and often in-
comprehensible natural phenomena, and therefore are not unambiguously related to 
efforts expended by hired workers, which means that these workers cannot be held 
fully accountable for their work. Both reasons generate asymmetric distribution of 
information between employer and employee, which can be opportunistically used by 
the latter, representing a typical case of principal-agent problem (see also 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986:519; Schmitt, 1993a). 
The consequence of the severe agency problems, caused by high dependence of ag-
ricultural production on nature, is the low feasibility of hierarchical organization of this 
production activity and the resulting dominance of family farms. According to Pollak, 
“the family farm can be regarded as an organizational solution to the difficulty of 
monitoring and supervising workers” (1985:591), which seems to be also accepted by 
most other writers on the subject. However, as noted by the author, it is not always so 
that agricultural tasks cannot be monitored in terms of inputs and outputs; whenever 
possible, family farms are “overshadowed by other forms of agricultural organization. 
For some crops and some tasks hired labor can be concentrated into work gangs and 
supervised directly, so plantation agriculture is possible” (1985:591), which generally 
confirms the idea that supervision difficulties represent the main factors dictating the 
optimality of family governance in agriculture.  
Why is it so that family governance represents an appropriate solution to the diffi-
culties in monitoring and supervision? Pollak indicates the following advantages of 
family governance: all family members have claims on family’s resources, which cre-
ates a residual interest to expend proper work efforts; information is not so 
asymmetrically distributed within families due to easier monitoring and intra-family 
communication; families are characterized by affectional relationships, which limit 
opportunistic behavior; finally, working diligently forms a part of maintaining “family 
loyalty”, which often represents an important value in social settings. Due to these 
characteristics of family governance, family workers choose not to take advantage of 
ample shirking opportunities, which would be otherwise used by hired workers. 
The important consequence of low feasibility of hierarchical organization in agri-
culture and the resulting optimality of family farms is the fact that the size of 
production units in agriculture is limited by the size of family. Because of the given 
difficulties in supervision and monitoring, family members are limited in their ability 
to use hired labor. As argued by Schmitt (1991:448), other things being equal, lower 
opportunity costs of family farm labor will be inversely proportional to the optimal 
size of family farm. Since the transaction costs of monitoring hired workers also rep-
resent the opportunity costs of family farm labor, there is an incentive for the family 
farm to maintain smaller size by minimizing the use of hired labor. This limitation on 
size generates two organizational problems of family governance and is beset by two 
problems: 1) intra-organizational, lying in their inability to realize the potential 
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inputs and credits, product marketing, machinery pooling, insurance, political lobby-
ing, etc.); and 2) inter-organizational, lying in the fact that up- and downstream 
firms in the agrifood system often have sizes significantly exceeding those of agricul-
tural enterprises. 
The inter-organizational problem essentially means that the market organization 
of linkages between agriculture and the input/output sectors is also not effective be-
cause of the resulting exposure of relatively small sized agricultural producers to 
highly concentrated markets dominated by a small number of huge firms. Apart from 
the threat of monopolistic pricing behavior, high specificity and fixity of assets (in 
the sense of Johnson and Hathaway) in agriculture give rise to the emergence of sig-
nificant appropriable quasi-rents, thus enabling opportunistic behavior on the part of 
input/output firms toward agricultural producers. Whereas transaction cost reasoning 
would predict that in such situations more unified and coordinated governance of 
inter-sectoral transactions is necessary, the use of this governance is limited by the 
above-mentioned monitoring and supervision difficulties.  
However, a crucial point largely underemphasized by transaction cost theory is 
that the coordinated governance needs not to be represented solely by hierarchy. Co-
operatives also represent a form of coordinated governance, which substitutes 
hierarchy when the latter would exhibit prohibitively high transaction costs. The con-
tribution of cooperatives to overcoming the organizational disadvantages of family 
governance is the subject of the following section. 
The role of agricultural cooperation 
The preceding discussion shows that while hierarchical organization in agriculture is 
not perfectly feasible, the market organization of inter-sectoral linkages in the agri-
food system is perfectly optimal for agricultural producers, thereby dictating the need 
in the use of family governance. This section will demonstrate: 1) how agricultural 
cooperatives can contribute to the solution of the own problems of family govern-
ance; and 2) how agricultural cooperatives are able to avoid difficulties in 
supervision and monitoring characteristic for hierarchical organization. 
The intra-organizational disadvantage of family governance, lying in its inability 
to capture external economies of scale, is overcome by machinery pooling coopera-
tives, specialized service cooperatives, credit cooperatives, as well as diverse variety 
of rural cooperatives providing benefits to rural households. Such cooperatives repre-
sent an extension of individual family farms allowing to combine the advantages of 
family governance with economies of large-scale production of required goods and 
services. The inter-organizational disadvantage of family governance, lying in their 
low market power in comparison to that of their up- and downstream trading part-
ners, is overcome by marketing, purchasing, and bargaining cooperatives and 
associations. These cooperatives also manage to capture the economies of large-scale 
business organization by retaining the economic and legal independence of their 
members (which of course have to fulfil their obligations toward their cooperatives).  
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high potential for agency problems caused by difficulties in supervision and monitor-
ing? First, it should be mentioned that cooperatives do not explicitly undertake the 
tasks where these difficulties are particularly pronounced. Rather, such tasks are left to 
family governance, whereas cooperatives concentrate on a number of “supporting” 
functions, whose need is dictated by the size disadvantages of family farms, although, 
to be sure, the tasks that cooperatives perform may not be necessarily characterized by 
high observability of processes and outcomes. Consequently, cooperatives are not gen-
erally free of incentives for shirking and free-riding.  
Second, the transaction costs of governance in cooperatives may stay in reasonable 
limits due to two mutually supplementing factors not characteristic of hierarchical or-
ganizations: 1) cooperative members always hold residual claims in the performance of 
their cooperatives, which serves to combat the agency problem; and 2) cooperative 
members, especially in the inception stages of operation of their cooperatives, person-
ally know and trust each other, i.e., possess social capital in the sense of Coleman 
(1988) or Putnam (1993)
3. Access to and ability to productively use social capital 
represents a fundamental characteristic of both cooperatives and family farms. Whereas 
in family farms social capital is ensured by kinship-based affectional relationships, 
noted by Pollak (1985), cooperatives draw social capital from cooperative ideology, 
embodied in particular by cooperative “values” and “principles”. Therefore, the first of 
the mentioned factors – the presence of residual claims – provides an economic ration-
ale of why farmers should cooperate, the availability of social capital explains why this 
cooperation should be possible. Both of these considerations seem to be equally impor-
tant for the existence of cooperatives. 
It should be pointed out that the importance of social and psychological relations 
for the emergence and development of cooperatives has been recognized long time 
ago, most remarkably on the above-mentioned concept of “the double nature” of 
cooperatives elaborated by Draheim (1955:16), who argued that every cooperative 
represents simultaneously: 1) an association of persons in the sense of sociology and 
social psychology, i.e., a social group, and 2) a joint enterprise, owned and operated 
by the same members of the group. According to Draheim, an individual may wish to 
join or create a cooperative as a social group due to such factors as: longing for so-
cial life and “emotional security”; the wish to become an active subject rather than a 
passive object; the wish to be a part of a stronger and larger social whole; the search 
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for social importance; love for other people, readiness to help, sympathy, humanitar-
ian aspirations, religious motives, etc. Summarizing this list, the author himself 
admits that “although these immaterial motivations may not always be separable 
from economic-rational ones, they predominantly stem from the irrational sphere of 
man” (1955:16). On the other hand, though, as follows from the preceding discus-
sion, the social orientation of cooperatives (i.e., the importance of belonging to the 
cooperative social group) may be explained without reference to irrational motiva-
tions: developing and maintaining social capital is a rational response to the need to 
combat the collective action problems. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that social capital will always be sufficient in co-
operatives to ensure their efficient informal governance. Cooperatives are known to 
have a number of incentive problems, which include: common property problem (the 
members’ equity contribution may not be proportional to the distribution of resulting 
benefits); horizon problem (members can capture benefits from their investment only 
over the time horizons of their expected membership in the organization, which causes 
a bias toward short-term investment and/or underinvestment); monitoring problem 
(decision management is allocated to decision specialists who are not residual claim-
ants); influence cost problem (some groups of members may have opposing interests 
and engage in costly lobbying activities); decision problem (large number and hetero-
geneity of members complicate the reaching of a consensual decision) (Borgen, 2003). 
Democratic decision making is generally associated with higher transaction costs than 
hierarchical ones (see e.g., Schmitt, 1993a). The argument presented here only suggests 
that in those cases when social capital is actually sufficient, then cooperatives represent 
an organizational mechanism to economize on transaction costs of monitoring and su-
pervision. The difference from hierarchies in this respect is that even if they had access 
to the required social capital, the formal instruments of governance would nevertheless 
have to be utilized and the respective transaction costs would also have to be incurred. 
To summarize, the benefits provided by agricultural cooperatives are mainly 
those benefits that the hierarchical organization would have provided if it could func-
tion effectively in agriculture. Whereas instruments of hierarchical governance such 
as monitoring and imposition of rewards and sanctions are associated with prohibi-
tively high transaction costs in agriculture, they can be substituted by voluntary self-
governance characteristic of cooperative organization. However, as was established 
above, the effective use of cooperative self-governance requires social capital. The 
extent of this substitution is therefore limited by the availability of social capital, 
since without it cooperative self-governance will also involve high transaction costs 
of its own. Since social capital is also scarce, cooperatives cannot fully compensate 
for the intersectoral disparities. However, they can continually invest in social capital 
to enable at least a partial compensation of this kind.  
This argumentation can provoke the following question: if cooperatives can out-
perform hierarchies by utilizing social capital, why cannot hierarchies themselves 
utilize this social capital? In itself, this question is rather deep and requires a separate 
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ity of hierarchies to accumulate and use social capital can be attributed to the impor-
tant differences in economic objectives of stakeholders of hierarchical organizations, 
specifically by inherent controversies between the objectives of employees, employ-
ers and owners, whereas the economic objectives of family farm members or 
cooperative members are more mutually congruent. In other words, the group morale 
is promoted by homogeneity of economic interests of group members and inhibited 
by their heterogeneity. This arguably explains why hierarchies do not develop as 
much as family farms and cooperatives can, and even if they accidentally had access 
to social capital, they still could not utilize it productively.  
Implications for the structural change in the agrifood system 
The traditional explanations of the farm problem, referring to low opportunity costs 
on factor use in agriculture and high factor mobility costs, attribute its existence to 
low ability of agricultural production units to undertake structural changes, which are 
necessary when returns on factors in agriculture fall below the respective returns in 
other sectors. In turn, the insufficient ability of agricultural production units to under-
take these changes can be attributed to the particular nature of governance adopted 
by them. Family governance prevents rapid structural adaptation due to the intertwin-
ing of the three basic roles of family farms – production unit, household, and social 
system. As emphasized by Hagedorn (2003), if a certain factor reallocation appears 
expedient for a family farm as a production unit, it might be undesirable from the 
viewpoint of its other roles.  
These difficulties would be evidently not relevant for hierarchical organization, 
which is characterized by clear separation of decision making processes of all in-
volved stakeholders. Hierarchy is considerably less restrained in its ability to 
reallocate production factors in a way which is optimal from the viewpoint of busi-
ness profitability. Therefore, in addition to the above described intra- and inter-
organizational disadvantages related to the small size of family farms, family gov-
ernance exhibits a drawback with respect to its ability to undertake rapid structural 
changes. This drawback, just like the two discussed above, can be also partially com-
pensated by agricultural cooperatives. 
To describe the way how cooperatives contribute to the structural development of 
agriculture and the resulting alleviation of intersectoral disparities (farm problem), a 
recourse can be made to the concepts of internalization and externalization of transac-
tion costs introduced by Hagedorn (2003). In this context, internalization of transaction 
costs means that decision making processes on factor reallocation take account of pos-
sible externalities that may occur as an outcome of factor reallocation. For example, the 
decision to shut down a farm and find an employment in an urban area, though eco-
nomically expedient, could impose negative externalities on members of family farm 
as a family. Conversely, externalization of transaction costs here means the ability of 
decision making units to ignore possible externalities of this kind. Using this terminol-148 V.  Valentinov 
 
ogy it can be stated that family farms exhibit a tendency to internalize more transaction 
costs in their decision making processes on factor reallocation than hierarchies. The 
roles of cooperatives here is to promote the externalization of those transaction costs 
not sufficiently externalized by family farms. 
There are arguably two types of transaction costs that can be externalized by co-
operatives: 1) costs represented by losses of farmers resulting from monopolistic 
practices and opportunistic behavior of upstream and downstream agribusiness firms; 
2) structural change-related costs represented by losses of farmers due to delayed 
structural change. Cooperatives can be quite effective in externalizing the first type 
of transaction costs to those agribusiness firms which cause them, although, as fol-
lows from the previous section, this externalization would be limited by the extent of 
availability of social capital among cooperative members. Cooperatives, however, 
are more limited in externalizing costs of the second type, since in the long term 
these costs increase due to general technological progress. But here, it is important to 
note that technological progress exerts significant pressure on family farms to under-
take structural changes in those cases when it occurs on these farms, as predicted by 
the Cochrane’s (1958) model. Cooperatives, however, can also perform the function 
of technological innovators, and respectively assume part of these pressures upon 
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The comparative properties of hierarchies, family farms, and cooperatives with re-
spect to the balance between internalization and externalization of transaction are 
demonstrated graphically in Fig. 1. In the Figure, hierarchies are assumed to maintain 
an equilibrium between internalization and externalization; family farms, due to their 
institutional characteristics, internalize more than externalize, and cooperatives exter-
nalize this residue (not externalized by family farms) and in this way maintain the 
equilibrium of internalization and externalization of transaction costs in agriculture. 
Accordingly, the “cooperative” section of the curve is shown to approach the hierarchy 
line. Theoretically, it may even exceed the hierarchy line if cooperatives are so strong 
that they externalize more transaction costs than are internalized by family farms, 
which may reflect the situation in those Western economies, where agricultural lobbies 
are extraordinarily strong and bring benefits to farms at the expense of taxpayers. 
Concluding remarks 
Whereas the traditional approaches to the farm problem explain it in terms of low 
opportunity costs and high mobility costs of factors employed in agriculture, the arti-
cle proposes an alternative, organizational economics, approach according to which 
the farm problem is the outcome of inappropriateness of hierarchical and market or-
ganization for effective coordination of agricultural activities. The organizational 
economics approach to the farm problem suggests that agricultural cooperatives are 
important because they partially perform the coordination functions not effectively 
delivered in agriculture by the conventional hierarchical and market types of eco-
nomic organization. Specifically, the feasibility of hierarchical organization in 
agriculture is impaired by significant difficulties in monitoring and supervising hired 
labor; the resulting use of family governance which is expected to substitute the hier-
archical organization generates additional problems: family farms find it difficult to 
realize external economies of scale and to develop market power comparable to that 
of their up- and downstream trading partners. These disadvantages represent major 
motives for the creation of agricultural cooperatives.  
Yet another disadvantage of family governance lies in its insufficient ability to ef-
fect structural changes required to bring the returns on factors employed in 
agriculture in conformity with respective returns in other sectors of the economy. 
This has been attributed to the tendency of family farms to internalize more transac-
tion costs than they externalize, which is again compensated by agricultural 
cooperatives serving to externalize these costs.  
On the whole, it has been argued that the role of cooperatives in agriculture es-
sentially lies in enabling the realization of advantages of hierarchical organization 
without the need to incur its transaction costs which are prohibitively high in agricul-
ture, whereas the advantage of cooperatives over hierarchies lies in the ability of the 
former to develop high amounts of intra-organizational social capital. Consequently, 
availability of social capital also represents a major limitation on the ability of coop-
eratives to perform these organizational functions.  150 V.  Valentinov 
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